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Abstract
We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contractual
incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption. In our model a ￿rm
chooses its technology and investment levels in contractible activities by suppliers of intermediate
inputs. Suppliers then choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payo⁄s
from an ex post bargaining game. We show that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the
adoption of less advanced technologies and that the impact of contractual incompleteness is more
pronounced when there is greater complementary among the intermediate inputs. We study a
number of applications of the main framework and show that the mechanism proposed in the
paper can generate sizable productivity di⁄erences across countries with di⁄erent contracting
institutions and that di⁄erences in contracting institutions lead to endogenous comparative
advantage di⁄erences.
Keywords: comparative advantage, economic growth, incomplete contracts, technology
choice, theory of the ￿rm.
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There is widespread agreement that di⁄erences in technology are a major source of productivity
di⁄erences across ￿rms, industries and nations.1 Despite this widespread agreement, we are far from
an established framework for the analysis of technology choices of ￿rms. In this paper, we take a
step in this direction and develop a simple model to study the impact of contracting institutions,
which regulate the relationship between the ￿rm and its suppliers, on technology choices.
Our model combines two well-established approaches. The ￿rst is the representation of tech-
nology as the range of intermediate inputs used by ￿rms; a greater range of intermediate inputs
increases productivity by allowing greater specialization and thus corresponds to more ￿advanced￿
technology.2 The second is Grossman and Hart￿ s (1986) and Hart and Moore￿ s (1990) approach to
incomplete-contracting models of the ￿rm. We study technology choice of ￿rms under incomplete
contracts, and extend Hart and Moore￿ s framework, by allowing contracts to be partially incom-
plete. This combination enables us to investigate how the degree of contractual incompleteness
and the extent of technological complementarities between intermediate inputs a⁄ect the choice of
technology.
In our baseline model a ￿rm decides on technology (on the range of specialized intermediate
goods), recognizing that a more advanced technology is more productive, but also entails a variety
of costs. In addition to the direct pecuniary costs of engaging more suppliers (corresponding to
the greater range of intermediate inputs), a more advanced technology necessitates contracting
with more suppliers. All of the activities that suppliers undertake are relationship-speci￿c, and a
fraction of those is ex ante contractible, while the rest, as in the work by Grossman-Hart-Moore,
are nonveri￿able and noncontractible. The fraction of contractible activities is our measure of the
quality of contracting institutions.3 Suppliers are contractually obliged to perform their duties in
the contractible activities, but they are free to choose their investments in noncontractible activities
and to withhold their services in these activities from the ￿rm. This combination of noncontractible
investments and relationship-speci￿city leads to an ex post multilateral bargaining problem. As
in Hart and Moore (1990), we use the Shapley value to determine the division of ex post surplus
between the ￿rm and its suppliers. We derive an explicit solution for this division of surplus, which
enables us to develop a simple characterization of the equilibrium.
A supplier￿ s expected payo⁄ in the bargaining game determines her willingness to invest in the
noncontractible activities. Since she is not the full residual claimant of the output gains derived from
1Among others, see Klenow and Rodriguez (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) or Caselli (2004) for countries, and
Klette (1996), Griliches (1998), Sutton (1998) or Klette and Kortum (2004) for ￿rms.
2See, among others, Ethier (1982), Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) for previous uses of this
representation. See also the textbook treatment in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). There is a natural relationship
between this view of technology and the division of labor within a ￿rm. We investigated this link in the earlier version
of the current paper, Acemoglu, Antr￿s and Helpman (2005), and do not elaborate on it here.
3Maskin and Tirole (1999) question whether the presence of nonveri￿able actions and unforeseen contingencies
necessarily lead to incomplete contracts. Their argument is not central to our analysis because it assumes the presence
of ￿strong￿contracting institutions (which, for example, allow contracts to specify sophisticated mechanisms), while
in our model a fraction of activities may be noncontractible not because of ￿technological￿reasons but because of
weak contracting institutions.
1her investments, she tends to underinvest. Greater contractual incompleteness thus reduces supplier
investments, making more advanced technologies less pro￿table. Furthermore, a greater degree of
technological complementarity reduces the incentive to choose more advanced technologies; though
greater technological complementarity increases equilibrium ex post payo⁄s to every supplier, it also
makes their payo⁄s less sensitive to their noncontractible investments, discouraging investments
and, via this channel, depressing the pro￿tability of more advanced technologies.
An advantage of our framework is its relative tractability. The equilibrium of our model can be
represented by a reduced-form pro￿t function for ￿rms given by
AZF (N) ￿ C (N) ￿ w0N; (1)
where N represents the technology level,C (N) is the cost of technology N, A is a measure of
aggregate demand or the scale of the market, and w0N corresponds to the value of the N suppliers￿
outside options. F (N) is an increasing function that captures the positive e⁄ect of choosing more
advanced technologies on revenue. The e⁄ects of contractual incompleteness and technological
complementarity are summarized by the variable Z. This variable a⁄ects productivity and is
decreasing in the degree of contract incompleteness and technological complementarity. Moreover,
the elasticity of Z with respect to the quality of contracting institutions is higher when there is
greater complementarity between intermediate inputs. This last result has important implications
for equilibrium industry structure and the patterns of comparative advantage, because it implies
that sectors (￿rms) with greater complementarities between inputs are more ￿contract dependent￿ .
We use this framework to show that the combination of contractual imperfections and tech-
nology choice (or adoption) may have important implications for cross-country income di⁄erences,
equilibrium organizational forms, and patterns of international specialization and trade.
First, we show that our baseline model can generate sizable di⁄erences in productivity from
di⁄erences in the quality of contracting institutions. In particular, using a range of reasonable values
for the key parameters of the model, we ￿nd that when the degree of technological complementarity
is su¢ ciently high, relatively modest changes in the fraction of activities that are contractible can
lead to large changes in productivity.
Second, we derive a range of implications about the equilibrium organizational form. Our results
here show that the combination of weak contracting institutions and credit market imperfections
may encourage greater vertical integration.
Third, we present a number of general equilibrium applications of this framework. The general
equilibrium interactions result from the fact that an improvement in contracting institutions does
not increase the choice of technology in all sectors (￿rms). Instead, more advanced technologies are
chosen in the more contract-dependent sectors. We show that in the context of an open economy,
this feature leads to an endogenous structure of comparative advantage. In particular, among
countries with identical technological opportunities (production possibility sets), those with better
contracting institutions specialize in sectors with greater complementarities among inputs. These
predictions are consistent with the recent empirical results presented in Nunn (2005) and Levchenko
2(2003).
As mentioned above, our work is related to two strands of the literature. The ￿rst investigates
the determinants of ￿rm-level technology (including the division of labor) and includes, among
others, Becker and Murphy (1992) and Yang and Borland (1991) on the impact of the extent
of the market on the division of labor and Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
on endogenous technological change. None of these studies investigate the e⁄ects of contracting
institutions on technology choice. The second literature deals with the internal organization of the
￿rm. It includes the papers by Grossman-Hart-Moore discussed above, as well as Klein, Crawford
and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1975, 1985), who emphasize incomplete contracts and hold-up
problems. Here, the papers by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) are
most closely related to ours. Stole and Zwiebel consider a relationship between a ￿rm and a number
of workers whose wages are determined by ex post bargaining according to the Shapley value. They
show how the ￿rm may overemploy in order to reduce the bargaining power of the workers and
discuss the implications of this framework for a number of organizational design issues. Stole and
Zwiebel￿ s framework does not have relationship-speci￿c investments, however, which is at the core
of our approach, and they do not discuss the e⁄ects of the degree of contractual incompleteness
and the degree of complementarity between inputs on the equilibrium technology choice.4
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on the macroeconomic implications of contrac-
tual imperfections. A number of papers, most notably Quintin (2001), Amaral and Quintin (2005),
Erosa and Hidalgo (2005) and Castro, Clementi and MacDonald (2004), investigate the quanti-
tative impact of contractual and capital market imperfections on aggregate productivity.5 Our
approach di⁄ers from these papers since we focus on technology choice and relationship-speci￿c
investments, and because we develop a tractable framework that can be applied in a range of prob-
lems. Although we do not undertake a detailed calibration exercise as in these papers, the results
in subsection 5.1 suggest that the economic mechanism developed in this paper can lead to quanti-
tatively large e⁄ects. Finally, Levchenko (2003), Costinot (2004), Nunn (2005) and Antr￿s (2005)
also generate endogenous comparative advantage across countries from di⁄erences in contractual
environments. Among these papers, Costinot (2004) is most closely related, since he also develops
a model of endogenous comparative advantage based on specialization, though his approach is more
reduced-form than our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic environment.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium with complete contracts. Section 4 introduces incomplete
contracts into the framework of Section 2, characterizes the equilibrium, and derives the major
comparative static results. Section 5 considers a number of applications of our basic framework.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs of the main results are provided in the Appendix.
4Another related paper is Blanchard and Kremer (1997), which studies the impact of ine¢ cient sequential con-
tracting between a ￿rm and its suppliers in a model where output is a Leontief aggregate of the inputs of the
suppliers.
5Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), Martimort and Verdier (2000, 2004) and Francois and Roberts (2003) study the
qualitative impact of changes in the internal organization of ￿rms on economic growth.
32 Technology and Payo⁄s
Consider a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm facing a demand function q = Ap￿1=(1￿￿) for its ￿nal product,
where q denotes quantity and p denotes price. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) determines the elasticity
of demand while A > 0 determines the level of demand or the ￿market size￿ . The ￿rm treats the
demand level A as exogenous. This form of demand can be derived from a constant elasticity of
substitution preference structure for di⁄erentiated products (see Section 5.3) and it generates a
revenue function
R = A1￿￿q￿: (2)
Production depends on the technology choice of the ￿rm. More advanced (more productive)
technologies involve a greater range of intermediate goods and thus a higher degree of specialization.
The technology level of the ￿rm is denoted by N 2 R+ and for each j 2 [0;N], X (j) is the quantity
of intermediate input j. Given technology N, the production function of the ￿rm is
q = N￿+1￿1=￿
￿Z N
0
X (j)
￿ dj
￿1=￿
, 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ > 0: (3)
A number of features of this production function are worth noting. First, ￿ determines the degree
of complementarity between inputs; since ￿ 2 (0;1), the elasticity of substitution between them,
1=(1 ￿ ￿), is always greater than one. Second, we follow Benassy (1998) in introducing the term
N￿+1￿1=￿ in front of the integral, which allows us to separately control the elasticity of substitution
between inputs and the elasticity of output with respect to the level of the technology. To see this,
consider the case where X (j) = X for all j. Then the output of technology N is q = N￿+1X.
Consequently, both output and productivity (de￿ned as either q=(NX) or q=N) are independent
of ￿ and depend positively on N, with elasticity determined by the parameter ￿.6
There is a large number of pro￿t-maximizing suppliers that can produce the necessary inter-
mediate goods, each with the same outside option w0. For now, w0 is taken as given, but it will
be endogenized in Section 5.3. We assume that each intermediate input needs to be produced by
a di⁄erent supplier with whom the ￿rm needs to contract.7
A supplier assigned to the production of an intermediate input needs to undertake relationship-
speci￿c investments in a unit measure of (symmetric) activities. There is a constant marginal cost
of investment cx for each activity.8 The production function of intermediate inputs is Cobb-Douglas
and symmetric in the activities:
X (j) = exp
￿Z 1
0
lnx(i;j)di
￿
, (4)
6In contrast, with the standard speci￿cation of the CES production function, without the term N
￿+1￿1=￿ in front
(i.e., ￿ = 1=￿ ￿ 1), total output is q = N
1=￿X, and the two elasticities are governed by the same parameter, ￿.
7A previous version of the paper, Acemoglu, Antr￿s and Helpman (2005), also endogenized the allocation of inputs
to suppliers using an augmented model with additional diseconomies of scope.
8One can think of cx as the marginal cost of e⁄ort; see the formulation of this e⁄ort in utility terms in Section 5.3.
4where x(i;j) is the level of investment in activity i performed by the supplier of input j. This formu-
lation will allow a tractable parameterization of contractual incompleteness in Section 4, whereby a
subset of the investments necessary for production will be nonveri￿able and thus noncontractible.
Finally, we assume that adopting (and using) a technology N involves costs C (N), and impose
Assumption 1
(i) For all N > 0, C (N) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, with C0 (N) > 0 and C00 (N) ￿ 0.
(ii) For all N > 0, NC00 (N)=[C0 (N) + w0] > [￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1]=(1 ￿ ￿).
The ￿rst part of this assumption is standard; costs are increasing and convex. The second part
will ensure a ￿nite and positive choice of N.
Let the payment to supplier j consist of two parts: an ex ante payment ￿ (j) 2 R before the
investment levels x(i;j) take place, and a payment s(j) after the investments. Then, the payo⁄ to
supplier j, also taking account of her outside option, is
￿x (j) = max
￿
￿ (j) + s(j) ￿
Z 1
0
cxx(i;j)di;w0
￿
: (5)
Similarly, the payo⁄ to the ￿rm is
￿ = R ￿
Z N
0
[￿ (j) + s(j)]dj ￿ C (N); (6)
where R is revenue and the other two terms on the right-hand side represent costs. Substituting
(3) and (4) into (2), revenue can be expressed as
R = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)
￿Z N
0
￿
exp
￿Z 1
0
lnx(i;j)di
￿￿￿
dj
￿￿=￿
. (7)
3 Equilibrium under Complete Contracts
As a benchmark, consider the case of complete contracts (the ￿￿rst best￿from the viewpoint of the
￿rm). With complete contracts, the ￿rm has full control over all investments and pays each supplier
her outside option. In analogy to our treatment below of technology adoption under incomplete
contracts, consider a game form where the ￿rm chooses a technology level N and makes a contract
o⁄er
h
fx(i;j)gi2[0;1] ;fs(j);￿ (j)g
i
for every input j 2 [0;N]. If a supplier accepts this contract
for input j, she is obliged to supply fx(i;j)gi2[0;1] as stipulated in the contract in exchange for
the payments fs(j);￿ (j)g. A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is a strategy combination
for the ￿rm and the suppliers such that suppliers maximize (5) and the ￿rm maximizes (6). An
equilibrium can be alternatively represented as a solution to the following maximization problem:
max
N;fx(i;j)gi;j;fs(j);￿(j)gj
R ￿
Z N
0
[￿ (j) + s(j)]dj ￿ C (N) (8)
5subject to (7) and the suppliers￿participation constraint,
s(j) + ￿ (j) ￿ cx
Z 1
0
x(i;j)di ￿ w0 for all j 2 [0;N]: (9)
Since the ￿rm has no reason to provide rents to the suppliers, it chooses payments s(j) and ￿ (j)
that satisfy (9) with equality.9 Moreover, since the ￿rm￿ s objective function, (8), is (jointly) concave
in the investment levels x(i;j) and these investments are all equally costly, the ￿rm chooses the
same investment level x for all activities in all intermediate inputs. Now, substituting for (9) in
(8), we obtain the following simpler unconstrained maximization problem for the ￿rm:
max
N;x
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿ ￿ cxNx ￿ C (N) ￿ w0N: (10)
>From the ￿rst-order conditions of this problem, we obtain:
(N￿)
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ A￿￿1=(1￿￿)c￿￿=(1￿￿)
x = C0 (N￿) + w0; (11)
x￿ =
C0 (N￿) + w0
￿cx
: (12)
Equations (11) and (12) can be solved recursively. Given Assumption 1, equation (11) yields a
unique solution for N￿, which, together with (12), yields a unique solution for x￿.10
When all the investment levels are identical and equal to x, output equals q = N￿+1x. Since
NX = Nx inputs are used in the production process, we can de￿ne productivity as output divided
by total input use, P = N￿. In the case of complete contracts this productivity level is
P￿ = (N￿)
￿ ; (13)
which is increasing in the level of technology. In the next section we compare this to equilibrium
productivity under incomplete contracts.11
The next proposition describes the key properties of the equilibrium (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then with complete contracts there exists a
unique equilibrium with technology and investment levels N￿ > 0 and x￿ > 0 given by (11) and
(12). Furthermore, this equilibrium satis￿es:
@N￿
@A
> 0;
@x￿
@A
￿ 0;
@N￿
@￿
=
@x￿
@￿
= 0:
9With complete contracts, ￿ (j) and s(j) are perfect substitutes, so that only the sum s(j) + ￿ (j) matters. This
will not be the case when contracts are incomplete.
10We show in the Appendix that the second-order conditions are satis￿ed under Assumption 1.
11This measure of productivity implicitly assumes that all the investments x(i;j) are measured accurately. There
may be some tension between this assumption and the assumption that the cost of these investments is not pecuniary.
For this reason in the previous version, we also considered another de￿nition of productivity: output divided by the
number of suppliers, P = q=N = (N)
￿ x. The ranking of productivity levels between complete and incomplete
contracts is the same under both de￿nitions and the quantitative e⁄ects of changes in ￿ on productivity are smaller
with our main de￿nition.
6In the case of complete contracts, the size of the market (as parameterized by the demand level
A) has a positive e⁄ect on investments by suppliers of intermediate inputs and productivity. The
other noteworthy implication of this proposition is that under complete contracts, the level of tech-
nology and thus productivity do not depend on the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
inputs, 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
4 Equilibrium under Incomplete Contracts
4.1 Incomplete Contracts
We now consider the same environment under incomplete contracts. We model the imperfection
of the contracting institutions by assuming that there exists a ￿ 2 [0;1] such that, for every
intermediate input j, investments in activities 0 ￿ i ￿ ￿ are observable and veri￿able and therefore
contractible, while investments in activities ￿ < i ￿ 1 are not contractible. Consequently, a
contract stipulates investment levels x(i;j) for the ￿ contractible activities, but does not specify
the investment levels in the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ noncontractible activities. Instead, suppliers choose
their investments in noncontractible activities in anticipation of the ex post distribution of revenue,
and may decide to withhold their services in these activities from the ￿rm. We follow the incomplete
contracts literature and assume that the ex post distribution of revenue is governed by multilateral
bargaining, and, as in Hart and Moore (1990), we adopt the Shapley value as the solution concept
for this multilateral bargaining game (more on this below).12
The timing of events is as follows:
￿ The ￿rm adopts a technology N and o⁄ers a contract [fxc (i;j)g
￿
i=0 ;￿ (j)] for every interme-
diate input j 2 [0;N], where xc (i;j) is an investment level in a contractible activity and ￿ (j)
is an upfront payment to supplier j. The payment ￿ (j) can be positive or negative.
￿ Potential suppliers decide whether to apply for the contracts. Then the ￿rm chooses N
suppliers, one for each intermediate input j.
￿ All suppliers j 2 [0;N] simultaneously choose investment levels x(i;j) for all i 2 [0;1]. In
the contractible activities i 2 [0;￿] they invest x(i;j) = xc (i;j).
￿ The suppliers and the ￿rm bargain over the division of revenue, and at this stage, suppliers
can withhold their services in noncontractible activities.
￿ Output is produced and sold, and the revenue R is distributed according to the bargaining
agreement.
We will characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE for short) of this game,
where bargaining outcomes in all subgames are determined by Shapley values.
12The incomplete contracts literature also assumes that revenues are noncontractible. As is well known, with
bilateral contracting or with multilateral contracting and a budget breaker (e.g., Holmstr￿m, 1982), contracting on
revenues would improve incentives. In our setting, we do not need this assumption, since each ￿rm has a continuum
of suppliers and contracts on total revenues would not provide additional investment incentives to suppliers.
74.2 De￿nition of Equilibrium and Preliminaries
Behavior along the SSPE can be described by a tuple
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn;~ ￿
o
in which ~ N represents the
level of technology, ~ xc the investment in contractible activities, ~ xn the investment in noncontractible
activities, and ~ ￿ the upfront payment to every supplier. That is, for every j 2
h
0; ~ N
i
the upfront
payment is ￿ (j) = ~ ￿, and the investment levels are x(i;j) = ~ xc for i 2 [0;￿] and x(i;j) = ~ xn for
i 2 (￿;1]. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will denote the SSPE by
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
.
The SSPE can be characterized by backward induction. First, consider the penultimate stage of
the game, with N as the level of technology, xc as the level of investment in contractible activities.
Suppose also that each supplier other than j has chosen a level of investment in noncontractible
activities equal to xn (￿j) (these are all the same, because we are constructing a symmetric equilib-
rium), while the investment level in every noncontractible activity by supplier j is xn (j).13 Given
these investments, the suppliers and the ￿rm will engage in multilateral Shapley bargaining. Denote
the Shapley value of supplier j under these circumstances by ￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)]. We derive
an explicit formula for this value in the next subsection. For now, note that optimal investment
by supplier j implies that xn (j) is chosen to maximize ￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)] minus the cost
of investment in noncontractible activities, (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn (j). In a symmetric equilibrium, we need
xn (j) = xn (￿j), or in other words, xn needs to be a ￿xed-point given by:14
xn = argmax
xn(j)
￿ sx [N;xc;xn;xn (j)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn (j): (14)
Equation (14) can be thought of as an ￿incentive compatibility constraint,￿with the additional
symmetry requirement.
In a symmetric equilibrium with technology N, with investment in contractible activities given
by xc and with investment in noncontractible activities equal to xn, the revenue of the ￿rm is given
by R = A1￿￿
￿
N￿+1x
￿
cx
1￿￿
n
￿￿
. Moreover, let sx (N;xc;xn) = ￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn), then the Shapley
value of the ￿rm is obtained as a residual:
sq (N;xc;xn) = A1￿￿ ￿
N￿+1x￿
cx1￿￿
n
￿￿ ￿ Nsx (N;xc;xn):
Now consider the stage in which the ￿rm chooses N suppliers from a pool of applicants. If
suppliers expect to receive less than their outside option, w0, this pool is empty. Therefore, for pro-
duction to take place, the ￿nal-good producer has to o⁄er a contract that satis￿es the participation
constraint of suppliers under incomplete contracts, i.e.,
￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) + ￿ ￿ ￿cxxc + (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn + w0 for xn that satis￿es (14). (15)
13More generally, we would need to consider a distribution of investment levels, fxn (i;j)gi2(￿;1] for supplier j,
where some of the activities may receive more investment than others. It is straightforward to show, however, that
the best deviation for a supplier is to choose the same level of investment in all noncontractible activities. For this
reason we save on notation and restrict attention to only such deviations.
14This equation should be written with ￿2￿instead of ￿=￿ . However, we show below that the ￿xed point xn in
(14) is unique, justifying our use of ￿=￿ .
8In other words, given N and (xc;￿), each supplier j 2 [0;N] should expect her Shapley value plus
the upfront payment to cover the cost of investment in contractible and noncontractible activities
and the value of her outside option.
The maximization problem of the ￿rm can then be written as:
max
N;xc;xn;￿
sq (N;xc;xn) ￿ N￿ ￿ C (N) subject to (14) and (15).
With no restrictions on ￿, the participation constraint (15) will be satis￿ed with equality;
otherwise the ￿rm could reduce ￿ without violating (15) and increase its pro￿ts. We can therefore
solve ￿ from this constraint, substitute the solution into the ￿rm￿ s objective function and obtain
the simpler maximization problem:15
max
N;xc;xn
sq (N;xc;xn)+N [￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) ￿ ￿cxxc ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)cxxn]￿C (N)￿w0N subject to (14).
(16)
The SSPE
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
solves this problem, and the corresponding upfront payment satis￿es
~ ￿ = ￿cx~ xc + (1 ￿ ￿)cx~ xn + w0 ￿ ￿ sx
￿
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn; ~ xn
￿
: (17)
4.3 Bargaining
We now derive the Shapley values in this game (see Shapley, 1953, or Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994). In a bargaining game with a ￿nite number of players, each player￿ s Shapley value is the
average of her contributions to all coalitions that consist of players ordered below her in all feasible
permutations. More explicitly, in a game with M + 1 players, let g = fg (0);g (1);:::;g (M)g be a
permutation of 0;1;2;:::;M, where player 0 is the ￿rm and players 1;2;:::;M are the suppliers, and
let z
j
g = fj0 j g (j) > g (j0)g be the set of players ordered below j in the permutation g. We denote
by G the set of feasible permutations and by v : G ! R the value of the coalition consisting of any
subset of the M + 1 players.16 Then the Shapley value of player j is
sj =
1
(M + 1)!
X
g2G
￿
v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
￿ v
￿
zj
g
￿￿
:
In the Appendix, we derive the asymptotic Shapley value of Aumann and Shapley (1974), by
considering the limit of this expression as the number of players goes to in￿nity.17 Leaving the
formal derivation to the Appendix, here we provide a heuristic derivation of this Shapley value.
Suppose the ￿rm has adopted technology N, all suppliers provide an amount xc of every con-
15Note that, as in the case with complete contracts, the ￿rm chooses its technology and investment levels to
maximize sale revenues net of total costs. The key di⁄erence is that with incomplete contracts, this maximization
problem is constrained by the ￿incentive compatibility￿condition (14).
16In our game, the value of a coalition equals the amount of revenue this coalition can generate.
17More formally, we divide the interval [0;N] into M equally spaced subintervals with all the intermediate inputs
in each subinterval of length N=M performed by a single supplier. We then solve for the Shapley value and take the
limit of this solution as M ! 1. See Aumann and Shapley (1974) or Stole and Zwiebel (1996b).
9tractible activity, and all suppliers other than j invest xn (￿j) in every noncontractible activity,
while supplier j invests xn (j). To compute the Shapley value for supplier j, ￿rst note that the
￿rm is an essential player in this bargaining game (if a coalition does not include the ￿rm, then
its output equals zero regardless of its size). Consequently, the supplier j￿ s marginal contribution
is equal to zero when a coalition does not include the ￿rm. When it does include the ￿rm and a
measure n of suppliers, the marginal contribution of supplier j is m(j;n) = @ ￿ R=@n, where
￿ R = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)
￿Z n
0
￿
exp
￿Z 1
0
lnx(i;k)di
￿￿￿
dk
￿￿=￿
is the revenue derived from the employment of n inputs with technology N, and the last input k = n
is provided by supplier j. Since x(i;k) = xc for all 0 ￿ i ￿ ￿ and all 0 ￿ k ￿ n, x(i;k) = xn (￿j)
for all ￿ < i ￿ 1 and all 0 ￿ k < n, and x(i;k) = xn (j) for all ￿ < i ￿ 1 and k = n, evaluating the
previous expression enables us to write the marginal contribution of supplier j as
m(j;n) =
￿
￿
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)
￿
xn (j)
xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿) n(￿￿￿)=￿. (18)
The Shapley value of supplier j is the average of her marginal contributions to coalitions that
consist of players ordered below her in all feasible orderings. A supplier that has a measure n of
players ordered below her has a marginal contribution of m(j;n) if the ￿rm is ordered below her
(probability n=N) and 0 otherwise (probability 1 ￿ n=N). Averaging over all possible orderings of
the players and using (18), we obtain:
￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)] =
1
N
Z N
0
￿ n
N
￿
m(j;n)dn
= (1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿
￿
xn (j)
xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿) N￿(￿+1)￿1,
where
￿ ￿
￿
￿ + ￿
: (19)
We therefore obtain the following lemma (see the Appendix for the formal proof):
Lemma 1 Suppose that supplier j invests xn (j) in her noncontractible activities, all the other sup-
pliers invest xn (￿j) in their noncontractible activities, every supplier invests xc in her contractible
activities, and the level of technology is N. Then the Shapley value of supplier j is
￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)] = (1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿
￿
xn (j)
xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿) N￿(￿+1)￿1, (20)
where ￿ is de￿ned in (19).
A number of features of (20) are worth noting. First, in equilibrium, all suppliers invest equally
10in all the noncontractible activities, i.e., xn (j) = xn (￿j) = xn, and so
sx (N;xc;xn) = ￿ sx (N;xc;xn;xn) = (1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1)￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
R
N
; (21)
where R = A1￿￿x
￿￿
c x
￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1) is the total revenue of the ￿rm. Thus, the joint Shapley value
of the suppliers, Nsx (N;xc;xn), equals the fraction 1￿￿ of the revenue, and the ￿rm receives the
remaining fraction ￿, i.e.,
sq (N;xc;xn) = ￿A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1) = ￿R: (22)
This is a relatively simple rule for the division of revenue between the ￿rm and its suppliers.
Second, the derived parameter ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ + ￿) represents the bargaining power of the ￿rm; it is
increasing in ￿ and decreasing in ￿. A higher elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs,
i.e., a higher ￿, raises the ￿rm￿ s bargaining power, because it makes every supplier less essential
in production and therefore raises the share of revenue appropriated by the ￿rm. In contrast, a
higher elasticity of demand for the ￿nal good, i.e., higher ￿, reduces the ￿rm￿ s bargaining power,
because, for any coalition, it reduces the marginal contribution of the ￿rm to the coalition￿ s payo⁄
as a fraction of revenue.18
Furthermore, when ￿ is smaller, ￿ sx [N;xc;xn (￿j);xn (j)] is more concave with respect to xn (j),
because greater complementary between the intermediate inputs implies that a given change in the
relative employment of two inputs has a larger impact on their relative marginal products. The
impact of ￿ on the concavity of ￿ sx (￿) will play an important role in the following results. The
parameter ￿, on the other hand, a⁄ects the concavity of revenue in output (see (2)) but has no
e⁄ect on the concavity of ￿ sx with respect to xn (j), because with a continuum of suppliers, a single
supplier has an in￿nitesimal e⁄ect on output.
4.4 Equilibrium
To characterize a SSPE, we ￿rst derive the incentive compatibility constraint using (14) and (20):
xn = argmax
xn(j)
(1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿
￿
xn (j)
xn
￿(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1)￿1 ￿ cx (1 ￿ ￿)xn (j).
18To clarify the e⁄ects of ￿ and ￿ on ￿, let us return to the derivation in the text and note that the marginal
contribution of the ￿rm to a coalition of n suppliers, each one investing xc in contractible activities and xn in
noncontractible activities, can be expressed as
mq (n) = A
1￿￿N
￿(￿+1)x
￿￿
c x
￿(1￿￿)
n
￿ n
N
￿￿=￿
=
￿ n
N
￿￿=￿
R;
where R = A
1￿￿N
￿(￿+1)x
￿￿
c x
￿(1￿￿)
n is the equilibrium level of the revenue (when n = N). The expression (n=N)
￿=￿
is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿ for all n < N. The parameter ￿ is given by the average of the (n=N)
￿=￿ terms,
￿ =
1
N
Z N
0
￿ n
N
￿￿=￿
dn =
￿
￿ + ￿
;
and is also decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿.
11Relative to the producer￿ s ￿rst-best choice characterized above, we see two di⁄erences. First,
the term (1 ￿ ￿) implies that the supplier is not the full residual claimant of the return from
her investment in noncontractible activities and thus underinvests in these activities. Second,
as discussed above, multilateral bargaining distorts the perceived concavity of the private return
relative to the social return. Using the ￿rst-order condition of this problem and solving for the
￿xed point by substituting xn (j) = xn yields a unique xn:
xn = ￿ xn (N;xc) ￿
h
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(cx)
￿1 x￿￿
c A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)￿1
i1=[1￿￿(1￿￿)]
: (23)
Note that ￿ xn (N;xc) is increasing in xc; since the marginal productivity of an activity rises with
investment in other activities, investments in contractible and noncontractible activities are comple-
ments.19 Another implication of (23) is that investment in noncontractible activities is increasing
in ￿. Mathematically, this follows from the fact that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿=(￿ + ￿) is increasing in ￿.
However, the economics of this relationship is the outcome of two opposing forces. The share of the
suppliers in revenue, (1 ￿ ￿), is decreasing in ￿, because greater substitution between the intermedi-
ate inputs reduces the suppliers￿ex post bargaining power. But a greater level of ￿ also reduces the
concavity of ￿ sx (￿) in xn, increasing the marginal reward from investing further in noncontractible
activities. Because the latter e⁄ect dominates, xn is increasing in ￿.
Now, using (21), (22) and (23), the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem (16) can be expressed as
max
N;xc
A1￿￿
h
x￿
c ￿ xn (N;xc)
1￿￿
i￿
N￿(￿+1) ￿ cxN￿xc ￿ cxN (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ xn (N;xc) ￿ C (N) ￿ w0N; (24)
where ￿ xn (N;xc) is de￿ned in (23). Substituting (23) into (24) and di⁄erentiating with respect to
N and xc results in two ￿rst-order conditions, which yield a unique solution
￿
~ N; ~ xc
￿
to (24):20
~ N
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ A￿￿
1
1￿￿c
￿
￿
1￿￿
x
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1￿￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿ ￿
￿￿1￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿ = C0
￿
~ N
￿
+w0; (25)
~ xc =
C0
￿
~ N
￿
+ w0
￿cx
: (26)
As in the complete contracts case, these two conditions determine the equilibrium recursively.
First, (25) gives ~ N, and then given ~ N, (26) yields ~ xc. Moreover, using (23), (25), and (26) gives
19The e⁄ect of N on xn is ambiguous, since investment in noncontractible activities declines with the level of
technology when ￿ (￿ + 1) < 1 and increases with N when ￿ (￿ + 1) > 1. This is because an increase in N has two
opposite e⁄ects on a supplier￿ s incentives to invest; a greater number of inputs increases the marginal product of
investment due to the ￿love for variety￿embodied in the technology, but at the same time, the bargaining share of
a supplier, (1 ￿ ￿)=N, declines with N. For large values of ￿ the former e⁄ect dominates, while for small values of ￿
the latter dominates.
20See the Appendix for a more detailed derivation and for the second-order conditions.
12the level of investment in noncontractible activities as
~ xn =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]
0
@
C0
￿
~ N
￿
+ w0
￿cx
1
A: (27)
Comparing (12) to (26), we see that for a given N the implied level of investment in contractible
activities under incomplete contracts, ~ xc, is identical to the investment level in contractible activ-
ities under complete contracts, x￿. This highlights the fact that di⁄erences in the investment in
contractible activities between these economic environments only result from di⁄erences in tech-
nology adoption. In fact, comparing (11) with (25), we see that ~ N and N￿ di⁄er only because of
the two bracketed terms on the left-hand side of (25). These represent the distortions created by
bargaining between the ￿rm and its suppliers. Intuitively, technology adoption is distorted because
incomplete contracts reduce investment in noncontractible activities below the level of investment
in contractible activities and this ￿underinvestment￿reduces the pro￿tability of technologies with
high N. As ￿ ! 1 (and contractual imperfections disappear), both of these bracketed terms on
the left-hand side of (25) go to 1 and
￿
~ N; ~ xc
￿
! (N￿;x￿).21
The impact of incomplete contracts on productivity follows directly from their e⁄ect on the
choice of technology. In particular, productivity under incomplete contracts, ~ P = ~ N￿, is always
lower than P￿ as given in (13), since ~ N < N￿.
4.5 Implications of Incomplete Contracts
We now provide a number of comparative static results on the SSPE under incomplete contracts,
and compare the incomplete-contracts equilibrium technology and investment levels to the equilib-
rium under complete contracts. The comparative static results are facilitated by the block-recursive
structure of the equilibrium; any change in A, ￿ or ￿ that increases the left-hand side of (25) also
increase ~ N, and the e⁄ect on ~ xc and ~ xn can then be obtained from (26) and (27). The main results
are provided in the next proposition (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique SSPE under in-
complete contracts,
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
; characterized by (25), (26) and (27). Furthermore,
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
satis￿es ~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn > 0,
~ xn < ~ xc;
21Note that as ￿ ! 1 the investment level ~ xn does not converge to x
￿, because the e⁄ect of distortions on the
noncontractible activities does not go to zero. What goes to zero, however, is the importance of noncontractible
activities in the production of ￿nal goods.
13@ ~ N
@A
> 0;
@~ xc
@A
￿ 0;
@~ xn
@A
￿ 0;
@ ~ N
@￿
> 0;
@~ xc
@￿
￿ 0;
@ (~ xn=~ xc)
@￿
> 0;
@ ~ N
@￿
> 0;
@~ xc
@￿
￿ 0;
@ (~ xn=~ xc)
@￿
> 0:
The main results in this proposition are intuitive. Suppliers invest less in noncontractible
activities than in contractible activities, in particular,
~ xn
~ xc
=
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]
< 1, (28)
which follows from equations (26) and (27) and from the fact that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿=(￿ + ￿) < ￿
(recall (19)). Intuitively, the ￿rm is the full residual claimant of the return to investments in
contractible activities and it dictates these investments in the contract. In contrast, investments in
noncontractible activities are decided by the suppliers, who are not the full residual claimants of
the returns generated by these investments (recall (21)) and thus underinvest in these activities.
In addition, the level of technology and investments in both contractible and noncontractible
activities are increasing in the size of the market, in the fraction of contractible activities (quality of
contracting institutions), and in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs.22 The
impact of the size of the market is intuitive; a greater A makes production more pro￿table and
thus increases investments and equilibrium technology. Better contracting institutions, on the other
hand, imply that a greater fraction of activities receive the higher investment level ~ xc rather than
~ xn < ~ xc. This makes the choice of a more advanced technology more pro￿table. A higher N, in
turn, increases the pro￿tability of further investments in ~ xc and ~ xn. Better contracting institutions
also close the (proportional) gap between ~ xc and ~ xn because with a higher fraction of contractible
activities, the marginal return to investment in noncontractible activities is also higher.
A higher ￿, i.e., lower complementarity between intermediate inputs, also increases technology
choices and investments. The reason is related to the discussion in the previous subsection where it
was shown that a higher ￿ reduces the share of each supplier but also makes ￿ sx (￿) less concave. Be-
cause the latter e⁄ect dominates, a lower degree of complementarity increases supplier investments
and makes the adoption of more advanced technologies more pro￿table.
The reduced-form pro￿t function depicted in equation (1) in the Introduction can also be derived
at this point. Combining (23), (24), and the condition for the ￿rm￿ s optimal choice of xc, the ￿rm￿ s
payo⁄ can be expressed as (see the Appendix):
￿ = AZ (￿;￿)N
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿ C (N) ￿ w0N; (29)
22Equation (13) above implies that the measure of productivity, P = q=(NX), has the same comparative statics as
technology. The same results also apply if we were to de￿ne productivity as P = q=N, that is, as output divided by
the number of suppliers. Yet, in this case ￿rms operating under di⁄erent contracting institutions would have di⁄erent
productivity levels not only because they choose di⁄erent levels of technology, but also because they have di⁄erent
investment levels. See Acemoglu, Antr￿s and Helpman (2005) for more details on this point.
14where
Z (￿;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿
1￿￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1￿￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿
(cx)
￿
￿
1￿￿ (30)
represents a measure of ￿derived e¢ ciency￿and captures the distortions arising from incomplete
contracts. The extent of these distortions depends on the model￿ s parameters as shown in Propo-
sition 2. In addition, we have the following lemma (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let ￿￿ (￿;￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ @Z (￿;￿)=@￿)=Z (￿;￿) be the
elasticity of Z (￿;￿) with respect to ￿ and let let ￿￿ (￿;￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ @Z (￿;￿)=@￿)=Z (￿;￿) be the
elasticity of Z (￿;￿) with respect to ￿. Then, we have that
1. ￿￿ (￿;￿) > 0 and ￿￿ (￿;￿) > 0; and
2. @￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ < 0 and @￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ < 0.
Part 1 of this lemma implies that better contracting institutions and greater substitutability
between intermediate inputs lead to higher levels of Z (￿;￿). Part 2, on the other hand, implies
that the proportional increase in Z (￿;￿) in response to an improvement in contracting institutions
is greater when there is more technological complementarity between intermediate inputs. The
intuition is that contract incompleteness is more damaging to technologies with greater comple-
mentarities, because there are more signi￿cant investment distortions in this case. This last result
implies that sectors with greater complementarities are more ￿contract dependent￿and will play
an important role in the general equilibrium analysis in Section 5.3.
Finally, to compare the complete and incomplete contracts equilibria, recall that they both lead
to the same allocation as ￿ ! 1. Together with Proposition 2, this implies (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let
n
~ N; ~ xc; ~ xn
o
be the unique SSPE with
incomplete contracts and let fN￿;x￿g be the unique equilibrium with complete contracts. Then
~ N < N￿ and ~ xn < ~ xc ￿ x￿.
This proposition implies that since incomplete contracts lead to the choice of less advanced
(lower N) technologies,23 they also reduce productivity and investments in contractible and non-
contractible activities.
23It is useful to contrast this result with the overemployment result in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). There are
two important di⁄erences between our model and theirs. First, our model features investments in noncontractible
activities, which are absent in Stole and Zwiebel. Second, Stole and Zwiebel assume that if a worker is not in the
coalition of the bargaining game, she receives no payment whatsoever. Since in our model investment in noncon-
tractible activities is not veri￿able, a supplier receives the upfront payment ￿ independently of whether she is in the
coalition, and she receives only the rest of the payment, i.e., sx, through bargaining. The treatment of the outside
option in Stole and Zwiebel is essential for their overemployment result (see de Fontenay and Gans, 2003).
155 Applications
We next discuss a number of applications of the basic framework developed so far. These applica-
tions emphasize both the potential quantitative e⁄ects of our main mechanism and its implications
for equilibrium organizational choices and endogenous patterns of comparative advantage.
5.1 Quantitative Implications
We ￿rst investigate whether our baseline model can generate signi￿cant productivity di⁄erences
from cross-country variation in contracting institutions. Our purpose here is not to undertake a
full-￿ edged calibration, but to give a sense of the empirical implications of our baseline model for
plausible parameter values. To obtain closed-form solutions for the equilibrium value of N and for
the productivity measure P = N￿, we assume that the function C (N) is linear in N, C (N) = ￿N.
Equation (25) then implies:24
~ P =
￿
A￿
￿ + w0
￿ ￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿(￿+1)
￿
￿
1￿￿(￿+1)c
￿
￿￿
1￿￿(￿+1)
x
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿(1￿￿(1￿￿))
1￿￿(￿+1) ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿(￿+1)
.
Our focus is on the impact of the quality of contracting institutions, ￿, on ￿rm-level productivity.
For this purpose, consider the ratio of productivity in two economies with the fraction of contractible
tasks given by ￿1 and ￿0 < ￿1,
~ P (￿1)
~ P (￿0)
=
h
1￿￿(1￿￿)(1￿￿1)
1￿￿(1￿￿1)
i ￿(1￿￿(1￿￿1))
1￿￿(￿+1)
h
1￿￿(1￿￿)(1￿￿0)
1￿￿(1￿￿0)
i ￿(1￿￿(1￿￿0))
1￿￿(￿+1)
￿
￿￿1￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿(￿0￿￿1)
1￿￿(￿+1) , (31)
where recall that ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ + ￿). Equation (31) shows that the proportional impact of ￿ on
aggregate productivity only depends on the values of the parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿.25
The parameter ￿ governs the elasticity of substitution between ￿nal-good varieties and also
determines the markup charged by ￿nal-good producers. In our benchmark simulation, we set this
parameter equal to 0:75. This implies an elasticity of substitution between ￿nal-good varieties equal
to 4, which corresponds to the mean elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) using U.S.
import data. This value of ￿ also implies a markup over marginal cost equal to ￿￿1 ￿ 1 ’ 0:33,
which is comfortably within the range of available estimates.26
24Recall from the discussion in footnote 11 that there are alternative ways of measuring productivity in the model,
and which one of these is more appropriate will depend on how productivity is measured in practice. If, for example, we
were to measure productivity as output divided by the number of suppliers, the impact of improvements in contracting
institutions on productivity would be even larger, because such improvements raise investment in contractible and
noncontractible activities as well.
25In deriving equation (31), we assume that the remaining parameters are held ￿xed when ￿ changes. We should
thus interpret our results as re￿ ecting the partial-equilibrium response of productivity to changes in contractibility.
26On the lower side, Morrison (1992) ￿nds markups ranging from 0:1 in 1961 to 0:29 in 1970, while on the higher
side Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) use an estimate of 0:6. See Basu (1995) for a discussion of the sensitivity of
the estimated markups to model speci￿cation and calibration. It is interesting to note that Morrison (1995) ￿nds
markups between 0:1 and 0:39 in Japan and 0:1 and 0:2 in Canada, Roberts (1996) ￿nds average markups between
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Figure 1: Relative productivity for ￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 0:25
We choose the parameter ￿ to match Bils and Klenow￿ s (2001) estimates of variety growth
in the U.S. economy from BLS data on expenditures on di⁄erent types of goods. Their ￿ndings
indicate that the growth of the number of varieties in the U.S. economy was around 2% per annum
between 1959 and 1999. If we assume that the variety of intermediate goods grew at the same
rate over this period and also that this variety growth was the main source of productivity (TFP)
growth in the U.S. economy, then we can use our model to back out a value of ￿. We take the rate
of TFP growth per annum to be 0.5% and use the fact that productivity is given by P = N￿. This
implies that
￿
N￿
t+1 ￿ N￿
t
￿
=N￿
t = 0:005 and generates a value of ￿ = ln(1:005)=ln(1:02) ’ 0:25.27
The value of ￿ is harder to pin down. Since the main theoretical ideas in the paper relate to
complementarity between di⁄erent inputs, a low value of ￿ may be natural. Nevertheless, since
we have no direct way of relating ￿ to aggregate data, we show the implications of changes in the
quality of contracting institutions for di⁄erent values of ￿.
Figure 1 depicts the value of the ratio in (31) for di⁄erent values of ￿ when ￿ = 0:75 and
￿ = 0:25. We consider three experiments. The middle curve depicts a shift from ￿0 = 0:25 to
￿1 = 0:75, the lowest curve depicts a more modest increase from ￿0 = 1=3 to ￿1 = 2=3, while the
highest curve illustrates the most extreme shift from ￿0 = 0 to ￿1 = 1.
The patterns in Figure 1 con￿rm the results in Lemma 2 and show that the impact of an increase
in ￿ on productivity is larger for lower values of ￿. More importantly, the ￿gure shows that the
0:22 and 0:3 in Colombia, and Grether (1996) ￿nds average markups between 0:34 and 0:37 in Mexico.
27A somewhat di⁄erent number is obtained from Broda and Weinstein￿ s (2006) estimate that the number of
varieties in U.S. imports between 1972 and 2001 grew at an annual rate of 3.7%. Using the same formula, this would
imply a value of 0:135 for ￿. Note, however, that this is likely to be an overestimate of variety growth and thus
an underestimate of ￿ because Broda and Weinstein consider the same good imported from di⁄erent countries as
di⁄erent varieties, and the number of exporting countries to the U.S. increased over time. For this reason, we choose
￿ = 0:25 as our benchmark parameter value.
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Figure 2: Relative productivity ~ P (0:75)= ~ P (0:25) for ￿ = 0:25 and alternative ￿￿ s.
quantitative e⁄ects can be sizable for a large range of values of ￿. For example, when ￿ = 0:25,
productivity increases by a factor of 2:5, 4:1 and 19:7 in the three experiments. However, as ￿
increases and intermediate inputs become more substitutable, the magnitude of the quantitative
e⁄ects diminishes. For example, when ￿ = 0:75, productivity increases, respectively, by a factor of
1:4, 1:7, and 3:2 in the three cases. Though smaller, these are still sizable e⁄ects.
We next discuss the sensitivity of these quantitative results to alternative parameter values.
While markup estimates are consistent with a value of ￿ = 0:75, other evidence suggests somewhat
higher or lower values of ￿. Figure 2 shows the results of an increase in ￿ from 0:25 to 0:75 when
￿ = 0:78 and when ￿ = 0:7, while leaving ￿ at 0:25.28 The ￿gure shows that the quantitative
e⁄ects are considerably larger in the case in which ￿ = 0:78, even for large values of ￿. For
example, with ￿ = 0:75, the improvement in contracting institutions leads to a proportional increase
in productivity of 4:4, which is a very sizable e⁄ect. Setting ￿ equal to 0:7 reduces the e⁄ect of
improved contractibility on productivity, but for ￿ = 0:25 we still ￿nd that the experiment increases
productivity by a factor of 1:8.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the results for alternative values of ￿, ￿ = 0:2 and ￿ = 0:3, while holding
￿ at 0:75. When ￿ = 0:2; the estimated e⁄ects are somewhat smaller than in our benchmark
simulation, but still sizable; with low values of ￿, the impact of an improvement in the quality
of contracting institutions on productivity is still large. For example, with ￿ = 0:25, productivity
increases by a factor of 2:0. On the other hand, greater values of ￿ lead to more signi￿cant responses
of productivity to increases in ￿. Even for a very high value of ￿ such as 0:75, productivity increases
by a factor of 4:8 as ￿ increases from 0:25 to 0:75.
Overall, this simple quantitative evaluation suggests that the mechanism highlighted in our
28Only values of ￿ less than 0:8 are consistent with Assumption 1 combined with ￿ = 0:25:
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Figure 3: Relative productivity ~ P (0:75)= ~ P (0:25) for ￿ = 0:75 and alternative ￿￿ s.
model is capable of generating quantitatively sizable e⁄ects from relatively modest variations in
contracting institutions.
5.2 Choice of Organizational Forms
An important insight of the incomplete contracts literature, and especially of Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), is to consider organizational forms (and the ownership of assets)
as a choice variable a⁄ecting ex ante investments. Our framework is tractable enough to allow these
considerations and can be used to discuss issues of vertical integration versus outsourcing, and how
the employment relationship between the ￿rm and its suppliers should be organized. We now brie￿ y
discuss how this can be done. A more detailed treatment is presented in our working paper version,
Acemoglu, Antr￿s and Helpman (2005).
We have so far assumed that the threat point of a supplier is not to deliver the noncontractible
activities, which￿ in view of the Cobb-Douglas structure of the production function of the inter-
mediate input in (4)￿ is equivalent to assuming that the supplier does not deliver X (j) at all.
Assume instead that the threat point of a supplier is not to deliver a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of her X (j),
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. The magnitude of ￿ depends, among other things, on whether the supplier is an
employee of the ￿rm or an outside contractor. Our analysis above corresponds to the case ￿ = 0.
The following lemma generalizes the Shapley value to the case where ￿ > 0 (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 3 Suppose that supplier j invests xn (j) in her noncontractible activities, all the other
suppliers invest xn (￿j) in their noncontractible activities, every supplier invests xc in her con-
tractible activities, and the level of technology is N. Then the Shapley value of supplier j is given
19by (20), where
￿ ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿+￿￿
(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
: (32)
Lemma 3 implies that the formula for the Shapley value is the same as before, except that now
the ￿rm￿ s share in the bargaining game, ￿, depends on ￿. Clearly, ￿ in (32) equals ￿ in (19) when
￿ = 0, but is greater when ￿ > 0. This is natural, since, with ￿ > 0, the bargaining game is more
advantageous to the ￿rm. In the limit as ￿ goes to 1, the ￿rm￿ s share ￿ also goes to 1.
Using this lemma, the working paper version demonstrated that all the results in Propositions
2 and 3 hold for any ￿ 2 [0;1) and employed this generalization to analyze the choice between
integration and outsourcing. Brie￿ y, suppose that for an integrated ￿rm, we have ￿ > 0, while with
outsourcing ￿ = 0.29 Then, when the choice of the upfront payment ￿ is not restricted, it can be
shown that the ￿rm always prefers outsourcing to vertical integration.30 In contrast, when suppliers
face credit constraints (in the sense that the upfront payment ￿ is restricted to be nonnegative),
integration may be preferable to outsourcing. In particular, when credit constraints are present and
￿+￿ < 1, there exists ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that vertical integration is preferred by the ￿rm for ￿ < ￿ ￿ and
outsourcing is preferred for ￿ > ￿ ￿. Furthermore, ￿ ￿ is decreasing in ￿, so that integration is more
likely when there is greater complementarity between intermediate inputs. This result implies that
vertical integration is more likely when both contractual frictions and credit market imperfections
are present.31
5.3 General Equilibrium
We now discuss how the technology choice can be embedded in a general equilibrium version
of our model. Besides verifying that general equilibrium interactions do not reverse our partial
equilibrium results, this analysis is useful as a preparation for the results in the next subsection,
where we investigate endogenous patterns of comparative advantage across countries. We start
with an equilibrium with a given number of producers (￿nal goods) and then endogenize this with
free entry. In this and the next subsection, we focus on the case where 0 < ￿ < 1, and ￿ = 0 as in
the baseline model.
Assume that there exists a continuum of ￿nal goods q (z), with z 2 [0;Q], where Q represents
the number (measure) of ￿nal goods. All consumers have identical preferences,
u =
￿Z Q
0
q (z)
￿ dz
￿1=￿
￿ cxe; 0 < ￿ < 1; (33)
29An integrated ￿rm has ￿ > 0 because in this case the ￿rm owns all the intermediate inputs. In this event the
most a supplier can do is not to cooperate in the use of her intermediate input, which will reduce the e¢ ciency with
which the ￿rm can employ this input, but may not reduce this e¢ ciency to zero. See Grossman and Hart (1986).
30This is because the ￿rm does not undertake any relationship-speci￿c investments. Since suppliers are the only
agents undertaking noncontractible relationship-speci￿c investments, it is e¢ cient to give them as much bargaining
power as possible. This will not necessarily be the case if the ￿rm were to also make relationship-speci￿c investments.
See, for example, Hart and Moore (1990), Antr￿s (2003, 2005), and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004).
31The positive e⁄ect of complementarity on the integration decision has been derived before in the property-rights
literature (see Hart and Moore, 1990).
20where e is the total e⁄ort exerted by this individual and the elasticity of substitution between ￿nal
goods, 1=(1 ￿ ￿), is greater than 1, and cx represents the cost of e⁄ort in terms of real consumption.
These preferences imply the demand function
q (z) =
￿
p(z)
pI
￿￿1=(1￿￿) S
pI ;
where p(z) is the price of good z, S is the aggregate spending level, and
pI ￿
￿Z Q
0
p(z)
￿￿=(1￿￿) dz
￿￿(1￿￿)=￿
is the ideal price index, which we take to be the numeraire, i.e., pI = 1. The implied demand
function A[p(z)]
￿1=(1￿￿) for each ￿rm is therefore identical to the demand function used in the
previous sections, with A = S.
Recall that each ￿rm in this economy solves the maximization problem (24) and its reduced-
form pro￿t function is given by (29). We assume that the degree of technological complementarity,
￿, varies across ￿rms (or sectors) with its support given by a subset of (0;1). We denote its
cumulative distribution function by H (￿). This formulation implies that if Q products are available
for consumption, a fraction H (￿) of them are produced with elasticities of substitution smaller than
1=(1 ￿ ￿).
The key general equilibrium interaction results from competition of producers for a scarce
resource, labor. Assume that labor is in ￿xed supply L. A ￿rm that adopts technology N employs N
individuals as suppliers and CL (N) workers in the process of technology adoption (implementation,
use, or creation of the technology). We assume that these are the only uses of labor (Assumption 1
now applies to CL (N)). Denoting the wage rate in terms of the numeraire by w, this implies that
the total cost of adopting technology N is C (N) = wCL (N). The wage rate w is taken as given
by each ￿rm, but is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The ￿rst-order condition of the maximization of (29) yields:
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
AZ (￿;￿)N
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ = wC0
L (N) + w0; for all ￿ 2 (0;1). (34)
Since each individual can be employed at the wage w in the process of technology adoption, their
outside option as a supplier is w0 = w. Equation (34) then implies that the technology choice
depends on a ￿ A=w, which is the inverse real cost of technology adoption (or the ￿equilibrium
market size￿ ). Let the equilibrium technology choice of N as a function of a, ￿, and ￿ implied by (34)
be N (a;￿;￿). De￿ning total labor demand by a ￿rm with technology N as CT (N) ￿ CL (N)+N,
condition (34) implies that N (a;￿;￿) is implicitly de￿ned by
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
aZ (￿;￿)N (a;￿;￿)
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ = C0
T [N (a;￿;￿)]; for all ￿ 2 (0;1): (35)
21Since ￿rms with higher elasticities of substitution choose higher N (Proposition 2), this equation
implies that N (a;￿;￿) is increasing in ￿. The demand for labor by a ￿rm choosing technology
N (a;￿;￿) is CT [N (a;￿;￿)], thus labor market clearing can be expressed as:32
Q
Z 1
0
CT [N (a;￿;￿)]dH (￿) = L; (36)
where the left-hand side is total demand for labor and L is labor supply. Since N (a;￿;￿) is
increasing in a, this condition uniquely determines the equilibrium value of a, i.e., our measure of
the real demand level. The relationship between a and the model￿ s parameters, as embodied in
this equation, illustrates the key general equilibrium feedback in our model. Proposition 2 implies
that N (a;￿;￿) is increasing in ￿, so we may expect better contracting institutions to encourage
all ￿rms to adopt more advanced technologies. However, the resource constraint, (36), implies that
not all the N (a;￿;￿)￿ s can increase with Q constant. Consequently, the equilibrium value of a has
to adjust to clear the labor market when ￿ rises.
To derive the implications of an increase in ￿ on the cross-sectional distribution of technology
choices, recall that the number of products, Q, is given, and di⁄erentiate the ￿rst-order condition
(35) to obtain
^ a + ￿￿ (￿;￿) ^ ￿ = ￿[N (a;￿;￿)] ^ N (a;￿;￿); (37)
where ^ y, de￿ned as dy=y, represents the proportional rate of change of variable y, ￿￿ (￿;￿) is the
elasticity of Z (￿;￿) with respect to ￿, and ￿(N) is the elasticity of the marginal cost curve C0
T (N)
minus [￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1]=(1 ￿ ￿), i.e.,
￿(N) ￿
C00
T (N)N
C0
T (N)
￿
￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
Assumption 1 implies that ￿(N) > 0. Moreover, as proved in Lemma 2 ￿￿ (￿;￿) > 0 and ￿￿ (￿;￿)
is decreasing in ￿. Next di⁄erentiating (36), we obtain a relationship between ￿ and a:
Z 1
0
￿L (￿) ^ N (a;￿;￿)dH (￿) = 0, (38)
where ￿L (￿) ￿ C0
T [N (a;￿;￿)]N (a;￿;￿). Substituting (37) into (38) then yields
^ a = ￿
R 1
0 ￿L (￿)￿￿ (￿;￿)￿[N (a;￿;￿)]
￿1 dH (￿)
R 1
0 ￿L (￿)￿[N (a;￿;￿)]
￿1 dH (￿)
^ ￿:
Since the term in front of ^ ￿ on the right-hand side of this equation is negative, an improvement in
contracting institutions increases wages relative to expenditure and reduces a.
Equation (38) shows that the proportional change in N in response to ^ ￿, ^ N (a;￿;￿), can be
positive only for some ￿￿ s (again because of the resource constraint). Since @￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ < 0
32Since it is straightforward to verify that the wage is always strictly positive, (36) is written as an equality rather
than in complementary slackness form.
22(from Lemma 2), the left-hand side of equation (37) is decreasing in ￿. Consequently, there exists
a critical value ￿￿ such that ^ N (a;￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿ < ￿￿ and ^ N (a;￿;￿) < 0 for all ￿ > ￿￿.
This implies that low ￿ ￿rms, with greater technological complementarity between inputs, are more
contract dependent. This establishes the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that in the general
equilibrium economy with Q constant, an increase in ￿ raises the level of technology N (a;￿;￿) in
all ￿rms with ￿ < ￿￿ and reduces it in all ￿rms with ￿ > ￿￿.
We next discuss how the number of products, Q, can be endogenized with free entry. To do
this in the simplest possible way, suppose that an entrant faces a ￿xed cost of entry wf, where f
is the amount of labor required for entry. This cost is borne in addition to the cost of technology
adoption. Moreover, in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003), suppose that an entrant
does not know a key parameter of the technology prior to entry. While in their models the entrant
does not know its own productivity, we assume instead that it does not know ￿, but knows that
￿ is drawn from the cumulative distribution function H (￿). Since the relationship between ￿ and
productivity is determined in general equilibrium, the distribution of productivity is endogenous.
After entry, each ￿rm learns its ￿ and maximizes the pro￿t function (29). This maximization
leads to the choice of technology as a function of a, ￿, and ￿, i.e., N (a;￿;￿), in (35). Let us de￿ne
￿(a;￿;￿) ￿ aZ (￿;￿)N (a;￿;￿)
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿ CT [N (a;￿;￿)];
where Z (￿;￿) is given by (30). This is an indirect pro￿t function, with pro￿ts measured in units
of labor. It is straightforward to verify that it is increasing in a, ￿ and ￿.
Free entry implies that expected pro￿ts must equal the entry cost wf, or
Z 1
0
￿(a;￿;￿)dH (￿) = f: (39)
This free entry condition uniquely determines the equilibrium value of a, without reference to
the labor market clearing condition (36). Consequently, given the equilibrium value of a, the
distribution of ￿ induces a distribution of productivity and ￿rm size in the economy (from the
￿rst-order condition (35)): ￿rms with larger ￿￿ s choose more advanced technologies and they are
more productive.33
Finally, the labor market clearing condition determines the number of entrants. Since labor
demand now includes individuals working in the founding of the ￿rms, the market clearing condition
33Note also that the degree of dispersion of productivity depends on the degree of contract incompleteness; in
countries with better contracting institutions there is less productivity dispersion and less size dispersion. This
follows from the fact that small ￿rms (i.e., low-￿ ￿rms) are larger in countries with better contracting institutions,
while large ￿rms (high-￿ ￿rms) are smaller in those same countries. This prediction of the model is consistent with
the empirical evidence reported in Tybout (2000), which indicates that there are signi￿cantly fewer medium-sized
enterprises in less-developed economies, which typically have worse contracting institutions.
23(36) has to be replaced with
Q
￿Z 1
0
CT [N (a;￿;￿)]dH (￿) + f
￿
= L:
Together with N (a;￿;￿) from (35) and a from the free entry condition (39), this modi￿ed labor
market clearing condition determinants the number of entrants Q.
An interesting implication of the general equilibrium with free entry is that an increase in the
supply of labor L does not create a scale e⁄ect and is not a source of comparative advantage. If
two countries that di⁄er only in L freely trade with each other, their wages are equalized, their
technology level is the same in every industry ￿, and they have the same distribution of productivity
and ￿rm size. The only di⁄erence is that the larger country has proportionately more ￿nal good
producers. This result contrasts with the case with an exogenous number of products, where
di⁄erences in L would generate comparative advantage.34
5.4 Comparative Advantage
Perhaps the most interesting general equilibrium application of our framework is to international
trade. Consider a world consisting of two countries, indexed by ‘ = 1;2. We now derive an
endogenous pattern of comparative advantage between these two countries from di⁄erences in
contracting institutions.35 Suppose that there is a ￿xed number of products and that every product
is distinct not only from other products produced in its own country, but also from products
produced in the foreign country. All products can be freely traded between the two countries.
Suppose also that the two countries are identical, except for their contracting institutions. In
particular, L1 = L2, Q1 = Q2 and H1 (￿) = H2 (￿) for all ￿ 2 (0;1), but the fraction of activities
￿‘ that are contractible di⁄ers across countries. Without loss of generality, we assume that ￿1 > ￿2,
so that country 1 has better contracting institutions.
The equilibrium condition for technology adoption (34) holds in both countries, with di⁄er-
ent wage rates, w‘, for the two countries (A is the same for both countries and equal to world
expenditure). De￿ning a‘ ￿ A=w‘ and N‘ (￿) ￿ N
￿
a‘;￿;￿‘￿
, we have
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
a‘Z
￿
￿;￿‘
￿
N‘ (￿)
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ = C0
T
h
N‘ (￿)
i
; for all ￿ 2 (0;1); ‘ = 1;2: (40)
In addition, the labor market clearing condition (36) holds in both countries. Consequently, the
country with better contracting institutions, country 1, will have higher wages and a lower a‘.36
The pattern of trade can now be determined by comparing the revenues of ￿rms with the same
value of ￿ in the two countries. We show in the Appendix (see the proof of Proposition 2) that the
34We have also worked out an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety, where the long-run rate
of growth depends on the degree of contract incompleteness. We do not discuss this model in order to save space.
35The link between contracting institutions and endogenous comparative advantage was previously discussed by
Levchenko (2003), Costinot (2004), Nunn (2005) and Antr￿s (2005).
36Suppose not, then (40) implies N
1 (￿) > N
2 (￿) for all ￿￿ s (since N
‘ (￿) is increasing in ￿ for given a), and so
labor market clearing cannot be satis￿ed in both countries.
24revenue of a producer with parameter ￿ in country ‘ is
R‘ (￿) = AZ
￿
￿;￿‘
￿
N‘ (￿)
￿￿
1￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿‘￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
h
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿‘) ￿
￿+￿
i; (41)
which is increasing in total world expenditure, A, in Z (￿;￿); and in the level of technology. But
it is also directly a⁄ected by the parameters through the last term on the right-hand side.
If R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) >
R 1
0 R1 (￿)dH (￿)=
R 1
0 R2 (￿)dH (￿), then country 1 is a net exporter of
goods with substitution parameter ￿. Consequently, we simply need to determine the distribution
of R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) across di⁄erent ￿￿ s. >From (41) we have
R1 (￿)
R2 (￿)
=
Z
￿
￿;￿1￿
Z (￿;￿2)
￿
N1 (￿)
N2 (￿)
￿ ￿￿
1￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿
￿+￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) ￿
￿+￿
: (42)
Both Z
￿
￿;￿1￿
=Z
￿
￿;￿2￿
and the last term in (42) are decreasing in ￿.37 Second, Proposition 4
implies that there exists an ￿￿ such that N1 (￿) < N2 (￿) for all ￿ > ￿￿ and N1 (￿) > N2 (￿) for all
￿ < ￿￿. As a result, country 1, which has the better contracting institutions, tends to export low-￿
products and import high-￿ products. If, in addition, ￿(N) is constant, the proportional change in
N (a;￿;￿) in response to an increase in ￿ is always smaller when ￿ is greater (because the partial
@￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ is negative, see Lemma 2). In this case, R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) is everywhere decreasing in ￿
and there exists ￿ ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that R1 (￿)=R2 (￿) >
R 1
0 R1 (￿)dH (￿)=
R 1
0 R2 (￿)dH (￿) for all
￿ < ￿ ￿￿ and the opposite inequality holds for all ￿ > ￿ ￿￿. Consequently, country 1, with the better
contracting institutions, is a net exporter in low-￿ sectors and a net importer in high-￿ sectors.
This result is summarized in the following (proof in the text):
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and ￿(N) is constant. Then there exists ￿ ￿￿ 2 (0;1)
such that in the two-country world equilibrium country 1 with ￿1 > ￿2 is a net exporter of products
with ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ and a net importer of products with ￿ > ￿ ￿￿.
The most important implication of this result is that di⁄erences in contracting institutions create
endogenous comparative advantage. A country with better contracting institutions gains a com-
parative advantage in sectors that are more contract dependent, which, in our model, correspond
to the sectors with greater technological complementarities between inputs.
The main implications in Proposition 5 receive support from a number of recent empirical
papers. Nunn (2005) and Levchenko (2003) use international trade data and the classi￿cation of
industries into more and less ￿contract dependent￿groups. Consistent with Proposition 5, they
￿nd that countries with better contracting institutions specialize in the export of goods that are
more ￿contract dependent￿ . Moreover, the impact of cross-country di⁄erences in the contracting
institutions on exports is quantitative large. Nunn, for example, ￿nds that the estimated impact
37Recall from Lemma 2 that Z (￿;￿) is increasing in ￿ and ￿, and @￿￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ < 0. Therefore Z
￿
￿;￿
1￿
=Z
￿
￿;￿
2￿
is decreasing in ￿ whenever ￿
1 > ￿
2. The fact that the last term is decreasing in ￿ follows from ￿
1 > ￿
2.
25of the quality of the legal system on the export of contract-dependent sectors is comparable to the
e⁄ect of human capital abundance on the export of human capital intensive products. In other
words, according to these estimates, di⁄erences in legal systems are as important as di⁄erences in
human capital abundance for explaining trade ￿ ows.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a tractable framework for the analysis of the impact of contractual
incompleteness and technological complementarities on the equilibrium technology choice. In our
model, a ￿rm chooses its technology corresponding to the range of intermediate inputs used in
production, and o⁄ers contracts to suppliers, specifying the required investments in contractible
activities. Investments in the remaining, noncontractible activities are then chosen by the suppliers
in anticipation of the ex post bargaining payo⁄s.
We used the Shapley value to characterize the division of surplus between the ￿rm and its
suppliers, and derived an explicit solution to these payo⁄s. Using this setup, we established that
greater contractual incompleteness reduces investments in noncontractible and contractible activ-
ities and depresses technology choice. The impact of contractual incompleteness on technology
adoption is greater in sectors with more complementary intermediate inputs.
The key mechanism developed in the paper leads to potentially large di⁄erences in productivity
in response to di⁄erences in contracting institutions. We also derived implications of this mechanism
for di⁄erences in the internal organization of the ￿rm across societies with di⁄erent contracting
institutions and a new mechanism for endogenous comparative advantage. These implications are
consistent with a range of recent empirical results in the literature.
It is also useful to note that while we have used a ￿love-for-variety￿model of technology, our
results do not depend on this speci￿c modeling approach. In equation (29) N can be interpreted
as a general technological investment, and the linkages between contracts and technology adoption
(or investment) highlighted in our analysis would apply independent from the speci￿c assumptions
regarding the nature of technology.
A number of areas are left for future research. These include, but are not limited to, the
following. The model assumes that all activities are symmetric; an important extension is to see
whether similar results hold with a more general production function, where the ￿rm may wish
to treat some suppliers of intermediate inputs di⁄erently than others, depending, for example, on
how essential they are for production. Another area for future study is an investigation of the
simultaneous determination of the range of intermediate inputs used by the ￿rm and the division
of labor among the suppliers. Finally, it is important to investigate whether the relationship
between contracting institutions, technological complementarities, and the choice of technology, is
fundamentally di⁄erent when we use alternative approaches to the theory of the ￿rm, such as the
managerial incentives approach of Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991).
26Appendix
Second-Order Conditions in the Complete Contracting Case
Let ￿ = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿ ￿cxNx￿C (N)￿w0N. Using the ￿rst-order conditions (11) and (12), the matrix
of the second-order conditions can be expressed as:
 
@2￿=@x2 @2￿=@x@N
@2￿=@N@x @2￿=@N2
!
=
 
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿Nc2
x (C0 + w0)
￿1 ￿cx [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)]
￿cx [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)] ￿N￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)](￿ + 1)￿￿1 (C0 + w0) ￿ C00
!
:
The second-order conditions are satis￿ed if this matrix is negative de￿nite, which requires its diagonal
elements to be negative and its determinant to be positive. The ￿rst diagonal element is negative; the
second diagonal element is negative if and only if
C00N
C0 + w0
>
[￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1](￿ + 1)
￿
;
and the determinant is positive if and only if
C00N
C0 + w0
>
￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
Note that if ￿ (1 + ￿) < 1 both of these conditions are satis￿ed, and if ￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1, the second inequality
implies the ￿rst inequality. Therefore Assumption 1 is necessary and su¢ cient for the second-order conditions
to be satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 1
The ￿rst part of the proposition is a direct implication of Assumption 1. The comparative statics of N￿ follow
from the implicit function theorem by noting that, except for ￿, N￿ increases in response to an increase in
a parameter if and only if this parameter raises the left-hand side of (11). Using the results concerning the
response of N￿ to changes in parameters together with (12) then implies the responses of x￿ to parameter
changes.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Related Results
We develop here a more formal proof than the one in the main text that builds on the work of Aumann
and Shapley (1974). Let there be M suppliers each one controlling a range " = N=M of the continuum
of intermediate inputs. Due to symmetry, all suppliers provide an amount xc of contractible activities. As
for the noncontractible activities, consider a situation in which a supplier j supplies an amount xn (j) per
noncontractible activity, while the M ￿ 1 remaining suppliers supply the same amount xn (￿j) (note that
we are again appealing to symmetry).
To compute the Shapley value for this particular supplier j, we need to determine the marginal contri-
bution of this supplier to a given coalition of agents. A coalition of n suppliers and the ￿rm yields a sales
revenue of
FIN (n;N;") = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
h
(n ￿ 1)"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿
i￿=￿
, (A1)
27when the supplier j is in the coalition, and a sales revenue
FOUT (n;N;") = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
h
n"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i￿=￿
(A2)
when supplier j is not in the coalition. Notice that even when n < N, the term N￿(￿+1￿1=￿) remains in
front, because it represents a feature of the technology, though productivity su⁄ers because the term in
square brackets is lower.
Following the notation in the main text, the Shapley value of player j is
sj =
1
(M + 1)!
X
g2G
￿
v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
￿ v
￿
zj
g
￿￿
: (A3)
The fraction of permutations in which g (j) = i is 1=(M + 1) for every i. If g (j) = 0 then v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
=
v
￿
zj
g
￿
= 0, because in this event the ￿rm is necessarily ordered after j. If g (j) = 1 then the ￿rm
is ordered before j with probability 1=M and after j with probability 1 ￿ 1=M. In the former case
v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
= FIN (1;N;"), while in the latter case v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
= 0. Therefore the conditional expected
value of v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
, given g (j) = 1, is 1
MFIN (1;N;"). By similar reasoning, the conditional expected
value of v
￿
zj
g
￿
is 1
MFOUT (0;N;"). Repeating the same argument for g (j) = i, i > 1, the conditional ex-
pected value of v
￿
zj
g [ j
￿
, given g (j) = i, is i
MFIN (i;N;"), and the conditional expected value of v
￿
zj
g
￿
is
i
MFOUT (i ￿ 1;N;"). It follows from (A3) that
sj =
1
(M + 1)M
M X
i=1
i[FIN (i;N;") ￿ FOUT (i ￿ 1;N;")]
=
1
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
i"[FIN (i;N;") ￿ FOUT (i ￿ 1;N;")]":
Substituting for (A1) and (A2),
sj =
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
i"
n
i"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "
h
xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿ ￿ xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
io￿=￿
"
￿
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
i"
h
i"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ ￿ "xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i￿=￿
".
For " small enough, the ￿rst-order Taylor expansion gives
sj ’
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c (￿=￿)"xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
(i")
h
i"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i(￿￿￿)=￿
";
or
sj
"
’
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿) (￿=￿)
h
xn(j)
xn(￿j)
i(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
(i")
￿=￿ ":
Now taking the limit as M ! 1, and therefore " = N=M ! 0, the sum on the right-hand side of this
28equation becomes a Riemann integral:
lim
M!1
￿sj
"
￿
=
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿) (￿=￿)
h
xn(j)
xn(￿j)
i(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)
N2
Z N
0
z￿=￿dz:
Solving the integral delivers
lim
M!1
(sj=") = (1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿
￿
xn (j)
xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿) N￿(￿+1)￿1,
with ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿). This corresponds to equation (20) in the main text, and completes the proof of the
lemma.
In addition, imposing symmetry, i.e., xn (j) = xn (￿j), the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ is
s0 = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1)x￿￿
c xn
￿(1￿￿) ￿ Nsj = ￿A1￿￿x￿￿
c x￿(1￿￿)
n N￿(￿+1),
as stated in equation (22) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we verify that the second-order conditions are again satis￿ed under Assumption 1. To see this, note
that the problem in (14) is strictly concave and delivers a unique xn = ￿ xn (N;xc), as given in (23). Plugging
this expression into (24) we obtain
￿ = A
1￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿)￿N
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿(1￿￿)x￿￿=[1￿￿(1￿￿)]
c ￿ cxxcN￿ ￿ C (N) ￿ w0N (A4)
where
￿ ￿
h
(cx)
￿1 ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
i￿(1￿￿)=[1￿￿(1￿￿)]
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)].
The second-order conditions can be checked, analogously to the case with complete contracts, by computing
the Hessian and checking that it is negative de￿nite.
Here, we present an alternative proof which also serves to illustrate how the reduced-form pro￿t function
(29) in the main text is derived. In particular, notice that for a given level of N, the problem of choosing xc
is convex (since ￿￿ < 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿) and delivers a unique solution:
xc = A
￿
￿c￿1
x ￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿[1￿￿(1￿￿)]=(1￿￿)
N
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ . (A5)
Plugging this solution in (A4) then delivers
￿ = AZN
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿ C (N) ￿ w0N;
where
Z ￿
￿
￿c￿1
x
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿￿=(1￿￿)
￿[1￿￿(1￿￿)]=(1￿￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
,
which simpli￿es to equation (30) in the text. This reduced-form expression of the pro￿t function immediately
implies that @2￿=@N2 < 0 if and only if the second part of Assumption 1 holds. Finally, from equation
(A5) we also have cxxcN￿ = AZN
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿ ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), which combined with (19) and (28) implies that
29the ￿rm￿ s revenues are
R = ￿ + C (N) + w0N + cxxcN￿ + cxxnN (1 ￿ ￿)
= AZN
1+
￿(￿+1)￿1
1￿￿
0
@ 1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
h
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
￿+￿
i
1
A,
which will be used in Section 5.3 (see equation (41)).
Next, the comparative static results follow from the implicit function theorem as in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. First, @ ~ N=@A > 0 follows immediately. To show that @ ~ N=@￿ > 0 and @ ~ N=@￿ > 0, let us take
logarithms of both sides of (25), to obtain
￿ (￿ + 1) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
ln ~ N + ln
￿
A￿￿
1
1￿￿c
￿
￿
1￿￿
x
￿
+ F (#;￿) = ln
￿
C0
￿
~ N
￿
+ w0
￿
;
where
F (#;￿) =
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿
ln
￿
1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
+
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿
ln
￿
#￿
￿1￿
, (A6)
and # ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) < ￿ is monotonically increasing in ￿. Simple di⁄erentiation delivers
@F (#;￿)
@#
=
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ #)
(1 ￿ ￿)#(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
,
which implies @F=@￿ > 0, and establishes that @ ~ N=@￿ > 0.
Furthermore,
@F (#;￿)
@￿
=
# ￿ ￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
ln
￿
1￿#(1￿￿)
1￿￿(1￿￿)
￿
+ ln
￿
￿
#
￿￿
(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿)
and
@2F (#;￿)
@￿2 = ￿
(￿ ￿ #)
2
(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
2 (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿)
< 0.
Thus, @F (#;￿)=@￿ reaches its minimum over the set ￿ 2 [0;1] at ￿ = 1, in which case it equals
# ￿ ￿ + ￿ ln(￿=#)
1 ￿ ￿
> 0:
This inequality follows from the fact that # ￿ ￿ + ￿ ln(￿=#) is decreasing in # for # < ￿, and is equal to 0
at # = ￿. We thus have shown that @F (#;￿)=@￿ > 0 for all ￿, so that @ ~ N=@￿ > 0.
Finally, note that straightforward di⁄erentiation of (28) delivers @ (~ xn=~ xc)=@A = 0, @ (~ xn=~ xc)=@￿ > 0
and @ (~ xn=~ xc)=@￿ > 0. And, in light of equation (26), the e⁄ects of A, ￿ and ￿ on ~ xc follow directly from
those on ~ N, where the inequalities become strict whenever C00 (￿) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Comparison of (30) with (A6) implies that
Z (￿;￿) ￿ ’eF(#;￿);
30where
# ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) =
￿￿
￿ + ￿
and ’ is a parameter that only depends on ￿ and cx. We have that F (#;￿) is increasing in both its
arguments, and that # is increasing in ￿, which establish part 1 of the lemma. To prove part 2, ￿rst note
that
@2F (#;￿)
@#@￿
=
￿(￿ ￿ #)
(1 ￿ #(1 ￿ ￿))
2 #(1 ￿ ￿)
< 0,
because # < ￿. Moreover,
￿￿ (￿;￿) ￿
￿
Z
@Z (￿;￿)
@￿
= ￿
@F (#;￿)
@￿
;
and therefore
@￿￿ (￿;￿)
@￿
= ￿
@2F (#;￿)
@#@￿
￿
@#
@￿
< 0.
Similarly,
￿￿ (￿;￿) ￿
￿
Z
@Z (￿;￿)
@￿
= ￿
@F (#;￿)
@#
￿
@#
@￿
;
and therefore
@￿￿ (￿;￿)
@￿
= ￿
@2F (#;￿)
@#@￿
￿
@#
@￿
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows from Proposition 2, since
n
~ N; ~ xc
o
converge to fN￿;x￿g as ￿ ! 1, and ~ N; ~ xc; and ~ xn are
all increasing in ￿ (nondecreasing in ￿, in the case of the investment levels).
Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. A coalition of n suppliers and the ￿rm yields a sales revenue of
FIN (n;N;") = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
h
(n ￿ 1)"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿ + (N ￿ n")￿
￿xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i￿=￿
,
(A7)
when the supplier j is in the coalition, and a sales revenue
FOUT (n;N;") = A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
h
n"xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "￿
￿xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿ + (N ￿ (n + 1)")￿
￿xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i￿=￿
(A8)
when supplier j is not in the coalition.
As in the case with ￿ = 0, the Shapley value of supplier j can be written as
sj =
1
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
i"[FIN (i;N;") ￿ FOUT (i ￿ 1;N;")]":
Plugging the new formulas for FIN (n;N;") and FOUT (n;N;") in (A7) and (A8) then delivers
31sj =
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
i"
(
i"(1 ￿ ￿
￿)xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "
h
xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿ ￿ xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i
+N￿
￿xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
)￿=￿
"
￿
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿)x￿￿
c
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
i"
"
i"(1 ￿ ￿
￿)xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿ + "
h
￿
￿xn (j)
(1￿￿)￿ ￿ xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
i
+N￿
￿xn (￿j)
(1￿￿)￿
#￿=￿
":
For " small enough, the ￿rst-order Taylor expansion gives
sj
"
’
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿) (￿=￿)(1 ￿ ￿
￿)
h
xn(j)
xn(￿j)
i(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)
(N + ")N
M X
i=1
(i")[(i")(1 ￿ ￿
￿) + N￿
￿]
(￿￿￿)=￿ ":
Taking the limit as M ! 1, now yields
lim
M!1
￿sj
"
￿
=
A1￿￿N￿(￿+1￿1=￿) (￿=￿)(1 ￿ ￿
￿)
h
xn(j)
xn(￿j)
i(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)
N2
Z N
0
z [z (1 ￿ ￿
￿) + N￿
￿]
(￿￿￿)=￿ dz:
Finally, integrating by parts delivers
lim
M!1
(sj=") = (1 ￿ ￿)A1￿￿
￿
xn (j)
xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿)￿
x￿￿
c xn (￿j)
￿(1￿￿) N￿(￿+1)￿1,
where
￿ ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿+￿
￿
(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿
￿)
,
as claimed in the Lemma.
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